light of key countries' tendencies to subordinate nuclear nonproliferation to short-term profits, it is important for those concerned by the spread of nuclear weapons to know that they need not idly wait on Security Council or European Union enforcement of the nuclear nonproliferation regime but can instead play a role themselves.
The Nuclear
Nonproliferation Regime and Nuclear Realities: Repair or Reassessment?
By Jack M. Beardt Many observers in 1963 might have viewed the proposition that only nine nations would have nuclear weapons in the year 2007 as highly unlikely.1 What prevented the cascade of new nuclear weapons states that was anticipated forty years ago, and how could the answer benefit modem attempts to limit nuclear proliferation? Even though the pillar of the current nonproliferation regime, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (the NPT),2 may make it somewhat harder or costlier for states to acquire or develop nuclear weapons technology, it is difficult empirically to establish a causal link between the NPT and the limited number of states with nuclear weapons in their arsenals today.
Some commentators praise the NPT regime and assert that it has played a critical, if not all-important, role in constraining nuclear proliferation. Yet in analyzing the reasons behind this phenomenon, it is difficult to disassociate or dismiss other possible interests, issues, or considerations that can also motivate states to forego possession of nuclear weapons. For example, basic factors such as the great expense associated with the development of nuclear weapons or the lack of perceived catastrophic security threats may in some cases discourage states from choosing the nuclear path. Additionally, in a recent case in which restraint failed, the NPT appears to have been largely irrelevant: North Korea simply announced its withdrawal from the treaty in 2003 and then proceeded with the apparently successful development and testing of a nuclear bomb in 2006.
Rather than concluding that the limited number of nuclear states is due to the overarching influence of the NPT regime, much of this restraint may be better explained by other factors, Some scholars argue that a norm against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and a taboo against their use have served to reinforce each other, advancing the theory that this taboo can play an important part in helping to deter nuclear proliferation.6 As is the case in attempting to demonstrate the impact of the NPTs legal restraints, empirically establishing the causal pathways between nuclear nonproliferation and a purported normative restraint is also a problematic undertaking. Even if a taboo against the use of nuclear weapons exists, it is not apparent that it readily translates into a taboo against their development and possession.
In fact, several arguments can be made against the existence of any such normative opprobrium being attached to their development and possession, particularly when compared with attitudes towards other weapons that are more widely regarded by the international community as abhorrent.
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Id., Art. VI. 4 For example, the Bush Administration recently proposed a multibillion-dollar plan to create a new generation of nuclear warheads. The plan has generated criticism, particularly in the context of the failure of the United States to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. See Walter Pincus, Congress Skeptical of Warhead Plan: Lawmakers and Experts Question Necessity, Implications of a New Nuclear Weapon, Wash.
Post, Apr. 22, 2007, at A05 (quoting former Senator Sam Nunn as saying that "If Congress gives a green light to this program in our current world environment... I believe that this will be misunderstood by our allies, exploited by our adversaries, [and] complicate our work to prevent the spread and use of nuclear weapons." First, in stark contrast to other multilateral disarmament regimes banning all member states from developing, producing, stockpiling, or otherwise acquiring or retaining a particular type of weapon?such as the regimes banning biological and chemical weapons?the NPT explicitly permits some states to possess nuclear weapons and in so doing makes the prohibi tion in that agreement less than universal.7
Second, unlike biological or chemical weapons, nuclear weapons continue to play a key role in the national security policies of the most powerful states and thus may be seen as conveying a corresponding level of status. Nuclear weapons and important related facilities such as those required for the uranium enrichment process are in fact increasingly viewed by some states as symbols of technical sophistication, prowess, and prestige, rather than as badges of shame or dishonor.8 Difficulties in stigmatizing nuclear weapons have been present since they were first used, due in part to their introduction by the victorious allies to defeat a Japanese war of aggression.9 In contrast to the revulsion generated by the use of chemical weapons in World War I that led to an international conference banning the use of both chemical and biological weapons in 1925, nuclear weapons unfortunately were embraced Although the BWC is deeply flawed by indeterminate language in its key provisions and by a lack of mandatory transparency mechanisms, neither the BWC nor the CWC explicitly exempt any state party from compliance with each regime's respective disarmament obligations. Proponents of a taboo against nuclear weapons concede that the lack of a universal nuclear prohibition in the NPT "departs in some ways from the objective characteristics of a taboo." See e.g., Tannenwald, supra note 6, at 9. 8 Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, the Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, has observed that the uranium enrichment process, which is a key capability in the building of a nuclear weapon, has come to be viewed as a own nuclear weapons or providing reasons for them to abandon nascent nuclear weapons programs.12 Even those scholars who believe that the NPT is responsible for preventing nuclear anarchy recognize that the security assurances provided by nuclear weapons states have always been an essential part of the larger nuclear non-proliferation regime.13 The question presented is whether the NPT has been the driving force behind nuclear nonprolifera tion or whether it actually has played only a minor role in comparison with other factors, particularly the realpolitik influence wielded by nuclear weapons states.
Beyond the influence that nuclear weapons states can exercise through security assurances and nuclear umbrellas, a variety of other economic, political, and military instruments outside the NPT legal framework continues to be available for these powerful states to advance specific nonproliferation objectives. For example, both the United States and Russia had fundamental interests in ensuring that Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine took immediate steps to abandon the nuclear arsenals that they inherited from the former Soviet Union. The United States used a spectrum of incentives, assurances, and assistance programs to facilitate the transition of these states to a non-nuclear weapons status.14 Under the auspices of one of these instruments, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the United States spent hundreds of millions of dollars assisting in the removal of nuclear weapons, destroying related components, silos, and delivery vehicles, converting some facilities to peaceful uses, and establishing various programs in these states to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology and expertise.15
In another area, the United States continues to advance specific nonproliferation goals through cooperative activities with many states under the Proliferation Security Initiative. This initiative and related projects, which include the coordinated interdiction of shipments of nuclear weapons technology and their delivery systems, have enjoyed some successes and are credited by some with playing a key role in the unraveling of a nascent Libyan nuclear weapons program.16
Nuclear weapons states and their allies continue to develop and collaborate on a variety of other multilateral programs outside the NPT framework in an attempt to prevent nuclear nonprolifera tion. These include the implementation of common guidelines for nuclear exports through the Nuclear Suppliers Group and proposals to limit non-nuclear weapons states' development of sensitive nuclear facilities such as those used for uranium enrichment by providing an assured access to nuclear fuel and related nuclear fuel cycle services.
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Japan is an example of a country with an understandably strong aversion to nuclear weapons that does not correspond with a national policy of rejecting nuclear protection. By creating calculated political, economic, and military disincentives for other states, nuclear weapons states thus continue to wield considerable influence in preventing and discouraging other states from acquiring nuclear weapons. While the NPT may offer support ing mechanisms that make it more costly for states to develop or acquire nuclear weapons technology, it is difficult to determine the precise impact of those mechanisms and even more difficult to prove that they have been a decisive factor in nuclear nonproliferation, particularly in comparison with other forces.
As nuclear weapons states continue to maintain security policies centered on their nuclear arsenals, do not seriously contemplate the abolition of nuclear weapons, and take no good faith efforts to achieve disarmament, the NPT legal regime remains divorced from the geopolitical framework in which it operates. To the extent that this gap is widened by actions of the great powers that emphasize the desirability of new or improved nuclear weapons systems and the possibility that more nuclear weapons testing will be required, the NPT is further weakened. Similarly, scholars who believe that it is critically important to maintain a strong taboo against the use of nuclear weapons are concerned that U.S. actions demonstrating continued reliance on nuclear weapons and the need for improved nuclear capabilities are likely to have a corrosive effect on that taboo.17 On one level, "repairing" the centerpiece of the nonproliferation regime, the NPT, is a simple matter: amend the treaty to prohibit the possession of nuclear weapons by all states and require the immediate destruction of these weapons in order to eliminate the threat they pose to all humanity. Although not without a rational basis in a post-Cold War security environment,18 such a revision of the NPT regime is highly unlikely to be accepted by nuclear weapons states since it is contrary to their firmly established strategic policies.
Continuing efforts to repair or improve the implementation of the NPT may yield some benefits,19 but the regime itself will continue to be undermined by blatant demonstrations of the asymmetrical nature of its rights and obligations. Nuclear weapons states, particularly the United States, could address this problem by taking steps toward decreasing the chasm between their disarmament obligations under the NPT and their current strategic policies and national security priorities. Barring such developments, however, an assessment of future options for dissuading, deterring or preventing new members from joining the nuclear club needs to take into account all the forces that have contributed to nuclear nonproliferation to this point in history and should not exaggerate the impact of the NPT. 
